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The State has misconstrued the Defendant's arguments contained in Point I. 
The State has concluded that since the prosecutor raised the issue in a motion in 
limine, to which defense counsel objected, that somehow this does not rise to the 
level of proper preservation of the issue on appeal. They cite no authority to this 
claim, but simply take the position that the defendant did not raise this claim 
below. (Appellee Br. at 8) For the State to propose that the defendant does not 
properly preserve an issue if the defense is not the first to raise the issue defies 
logic and goes contrary to established Utah case law. (See State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 
778, 779 (Utah 2000) in which the Court addressed an issue which was raised by 
the prosecution in a motion in limine.) 
In the present case, the prosecutor raised both the issue of the Defendant's 
parole status and the occurrence in prison in the motion in limine at the pretrial 
hearing. The trial court then heard arguments and made rulings that covered 8 
pages of transcript. (R. 210: 9-16) This Court has ruled that the preservation of an 
issue on appeal requires only that the issue be brought to the trial courts attention. 
There is no requirement that the issue be raised by a certain party. In the case of 
State v. Shultz 2002 UT App 366 the Court held: 
1 
"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the 
issue before the trial court." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 
P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). "A matter is sufficiently raised if 
it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on the issue." M (quotations and citation omitted). 
Thus, an issue must be "raised in a timely fashion," must be 
"specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a Tevel 
of consciousness' before the trial court," and must be supported by 
evidence or relevant legal authority. hL. at 130 (citations omitted). 
In the present case the issue was clearly brought before the trial court. All 
parties, including the trial judge, knew the issues. The defense made clear 
objections, which included the position that the court needed to determine if the 
evidence was relevant, and if the prejudicial effect exceeded the probative value, as 
proposed by defense counsel.1 The trial court then made a ruling that the evidence 
regarding the prison incident would come in. The trial court also ruled that the 
parole issue could come in "if they came up in his discussions and he brought those 
up, they came up in his discussion." (R. 210:14-15) 
The State takes the position that the defense has not adequately briefed the 
issue. If they take that position on the basis of not arguing plain error (See Applee 
Br. at 11) then they are correct in Point I, since the plain error argument was 
1
 Defense counsel stated "... if the Court deems it to be relevant. I mean, my 
position as defense counsel is that it's perhaps more prejudicial than probative,"(R. 
210:13) 
2
 The issue as to whether the prosecutor went beyond the courts ruling is addressed 
in Point II below under a plain error standard. 
2 
presented in Point II. If the State takes this position as to the abuse of discretion 
standard then they are not familiar with the doctrine of Stare Decisis. The 
Defendant has cited both the relevant Utah Rule of Evidence, and the leading case 
on this issue, State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999), as well as other less 
cited cases. The defendant has also made a reasoned analysis based on those cases. 
(SeeAplt. Br. at 21-24) 
The final claim that the State makes in it's brief is that the error was invited. 
They cite only a portion of the relevant record to reach this conclusion, ("defense 
counsel telling court: T obviously can't - we couldn't constrict the State on how it 
presents its evidence and what it presents, if this Court deems it to be relevant'" 
Appellee Br. at 12) A thorough review of the remainder of the record, including 
the statement of defense counsel that immediately followed the cited statement 
was: "my position as defense counsel is that it's perhaps more prejudicial than 
probative..." (R. 210:13). This demonstrates a clear objection and at a minimum a 
notice to the trial judge that he must decide the prejudicial/probative effect of the 
evidence. The State's citation to the case of State v. Brown 948 P.2d 337, 343 
(Utah 1997) is misplaced, since that case deals with a plain error standard, not a 
clearly preserved objection ruled on at the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, as in 
the present case. 
3 
Since the State has made no argument regarding the substantive matters of 
this issue, it has apparently conceded that the extensive testimony and closing 
argument concerning the parole issue and the prison incident is indeed error, which 
warrants reversal. 
Point II 
The State claims that the prosecutor did not refer to the Defendant's parole 
status during its case in chief, yet cites to the record the testimony of Kevin Mann, 
a detective, in which the Defendant said he would give information in exchange for 
"not going back to prison". (Appellee Br. 15) The State also acknowledges that 
the prosecutor on cross-examination is the first to elicit the term "parole officer" 
during a question of the Defendant's grandfather. (Appellee Br. 16) Together with 
the testimony that "he hid... Because like I told you he was away from a halfway 
house" (Appellee Br. 15). In addition the prosecutor, again on cross-examination 
of the Defendant's father elicited testimony that "the father knew he was 'wanted 
by the parole authorities' and 'had absconded'" (Appellee Br. 16) 
The State somehow maintains that "although defendant claims the State 
improperly elicited evidence 'that the defendant was wanted by the parole 
authorities, that he had absconded, and that he was hiding from the police and 
parole authorities', the State has found nothing in the record to support his claim" 
(AppleeBr. 16-17) 
4 
The only plausible reasoning is that the Defendant somehow opened the 
door to these lines of questioning. However, a careful reading of the record show 
that the first mention that the Defendant had been in prison was on direct 
examination of Detective Mann by the prosecution. (R. 204:69) And the first 
mention of the term "parole officer" was again by the prosecution during cross-
examination of the grandfather. The State's claim that the defense "opened the 
door55 is apparently referring to two non-responsive statements about the halfway 
house made by the Defendant's grandfather during direct exam.3 
Regarding the issue of the prison status claim, the Defendant argues that the 
State improperly elicited testimony of his prison status and the maximum security 
status, the suicide watch, and the officers forcibly removing his clothing. The 
State has again maintained that they have "found nothing in the record to support 
these claims". (Appellee Br. at 21) They have somehow overlooked the direct 
questioning of Lieutenant Doug Cook who when asked by the prosecutor as to his 
employment answered "Utah State Prison" and then the follow-up question by the 
prosecutor "And do you have a specific area at the prison that you're responsible 
for?", to which he answered "Yes, I'm the housing lieutenant over the Uintah One 
3
 The first question to the grandfather was simply where the defendant was living 
on the day of the murder, which the answer was at his home, (R. 205:87-88) and 
the second was whether the defendant left the house when the police arrived (R. 
205:91) 
5 
Maximum Security Facility". (R. 205:42) Further, the prosecutor elicited testimony 
regarding the Defendant requesting a crisis worker and the mental health worker 
requesting the officers remove his clothing so he could not hurt himself or others 
and the officers forcibly removing his clothing (R. 205:45) 
The State claims the Defendant has inadequately briefed this issue. 
However, the Defendant has cited two cases that are directly on point. First State v. 
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 1990) wherein the Court held "Generally, 
inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been found to be so prejudicial as 
to amount to plain error." As well as United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 
(8 Cir. 1987) in which a similar pre-trial motion in limine was made, and the 
prosecutor went beyond the scope of the ruling by the trial judge and elicited 
testimony about prior bad acts that was determined to be so prejudicial that a 
reversal was required. 
Since the State has made no argument regarding the substantive matters of 
these issues, it has apparently conceded that the extensive testimony and closing 




The State contends that the Defendant did not properly raise the hearsay 
issue at trial. (Appellee Br. At 26) The State claims "Here, defendant failed to 
preserve this claim in the trial court." And "defendant never objected to the 
admissibility of Terry's statements under rule 804(b)(5)(B) and (C). (Appellee Br. 
at 29) 
A careful reading of the trial transcript however reveals that this issue was 
properly preserved. The prosecution brought the motion to find Terry Brown 
"unavailable so we may put on her prior statement to Detective Weloth". (R 
203:121) Both the wording and the context of the motion clearly alerted the trial 
court to the hearsay nature of the proposed testimony. The defense clearly objected 
to the introduction of this evidence. Trial counsel stated "...We do object to that 
for the record." (R 203:121) Furthermore, the defense reiterated its objection after 
the trial court ruled "[S]o I think the State would be allowed at this point to call 
Officer Weloth and relate those statements." (R 203:128) For the State to now 
claim that this is not "specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very 
error" (Appellee Br. at 28 (quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc. 912 
P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996))) stretches the limit of both reason and sensibility. 
This Court has ruled that the preservation of an issue on appeal requires 
only that the issue be brought to the trial court's attention, not that certain magic 
7 
words be spoken. Nor is there any requirement that the issue be raised by a certain 
party. In the case of State v. Shultz 2002 UT App 366 the Court held: 
"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the 
issue before the trial court." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 
P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). "A matter is sufficiently raised if 
it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on the issue." Id_ (quotations and citation omitted). 
Thus, an issue must be "raised in a timely fashion," must be 
"specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a 'level 
of consciousness1 before the trial court," and must be supported by 
evidence or relevant legal authority. Id, at 130 (citations omitted). 
(See also State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 778, 779 (Utah 2000)) 
In the present case the prosecution moved the court to allow the 
testimony of Detective Weloth concerning the statements made by Terry 
Brown. Clearly a hearsay issue, raised under the theory that the witness was 
unavailable. This motion "submitted [the issue] to the trial court," and "the 
court [was] afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue." (Id. at 19) 
Furthermore, since the motion was made, and the hearing was held prior to 
the presentation of the evidence, it was "raised in a timely fashion." (Id.) 
Since the motion made by the prosecutor requested hearsay testimony, the 
prosecutors motion and the defense objection "specifically raised such that 
the issue [was] sufficiently raised to a 'level of consciousness' before the 
trial court." (Id.) Finally, there were 8 pages of transcript covering the 
evidence and argument devoted to the issue, thus satisfying the requirement 
8 
that the issue "must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." 
(Id.) 
The State has not argued the merits of the Defendant's claim, and therefore 
apparently has conceded the validity of this issue as well. 
Point IV 
The State makes the claim that the Defendant did not properly preserve the 
issue for appeal since the error was invited. Although defense counsel did not 
object to the first two foundational witnesses, they never testified to the 
objectionable statement. The prosecution then put on Detective Lucas and the 
objections were raised. While acknowledging that the objection was perhaps not 
done in the optimal style, the error was objected to contemporaneously with the 
4
 In State v. Shultz infra, the trial court apparently heard evidence and argument, 
with no legal authority cited. The relevant paragraph is as follows: 
Here, defense counsel raised concern about the presence of Oscar in the 
courtroom during the handler's testimony, about the State's experts testifying 
about the superior ability of canine accelerant detection over laboratory 
analysis, and about the experts testifying beyond the scope of their expertise, 
specifically contending that a veterinarian or forensic expert was more 
appropriate. Furthermore, Schultz objected to testimony concerning the 
921's discussion of canines, the use of canines as an investigative tool, and 
the olfactories of a canine. He also objected to Mr. Long's reliance on 
studies that were not conducted by veterinarians with special training in fire 
investigation. The trial court overruled Schultz's objections and determined 
that the expertise of Mr. Long was sufficient and that a veterinarian was not 
necessary. Because Schultz challenged the testimony of the experts 
concerning canine accelerant detection and the trial court had the 
opportunity to rule on the issue, the issue was properly preserved below. (Id 
at 19) 
9 
testimony, and the motion for mistrial was timely. The standard of review for a 
motion for mistrial is a review for abuse of discretion. (See State v. Decorso, 993 
P.2d 837, 846 (Utah 1999)) and abuse of discretion occurs when "the incident so 
likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial". 
(Id. at 846) In this case the defendant has argued in his brief that such a result has 
occurred. 
Point V 
The cumulative error issue was adequately briefed in the Appellant's 
original brief and the Defendant refers the court to that brief rather than repeat that 
argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial r-^ 
DATED this j ^ day of January, 2003. /
 0 ^ 
LNDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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